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Abstract. We study the use of Bayesian persuasion (i.e., strategic use of information disclosure/signaling)
in endogenous team formation. This is an important consideration in settings such as crowdsourcing
competitions, open science challenges and group-based assignments, where a large number of agents
organize themselves into small teams which then compete against each other. A central tension here
is between the strategic interests of agents who want to have the highest-performing team, and that
of the principal who wants teams to be balanced. Moreover, although the principal cannot choose the
teams or modify rewards, she often has additional knowledge of agents’ abilities, and can leverage this
information asymmetry to provide signals that influence team formation. Our work uncovers the critical
role of self-awareness (i.e., knowledge of one’s own abilities) for the design of such mechanisms. For
settings with two-member teams and binary-valued agents partitioned into a constant number of prior
classes, we provide signaling mechanisms which are asymptotically optimal when agents are agnostic of
their own abilities. On the other hand, when agents are self-aware, then we show that there is no signal-
ing mechanism that can do better than not releasing information, while satisfying agent participation
constraints.
1 Introduction
Consider a course instructor who wants to pair up students into teams of two for completing assign-
ments. Each student has an unknown ‘aptitude’ for the course, with past performance (academic
background, GPA, etc.) providing a prior on these aptitudes; moreover, everyone wants a teammate
with the highest possible aptitude. In the absence of any other information, the priors translate
into a perceived ranking over students, and if left alone, students will pair up according to this
ranking (i.e., the top two form one team, the next two form another, and so on). On the other hand,
the instructor would prefer it if high-performing and low-performing students worked together, to
encourage better learning outcomes. However, she does not want to decide the teams herself, or
alter the grading to incentivize such teams to form. Is there anything she can do in such a setting?
The above problem takes on a much more meaningful form in the context of collaboration in
open science challenges and crowdsourcing competitions [3]. As an example, consider the DREAM
Challenges [8] – an online crowdsolving platform which leverages researchers from various back-
grounds to solve problems in biology and medicine. A critical design feature of these challenges
is that after an initial exploration round, competitors are required to pair up into teams – this is
inspired by observations that the performance of individual contestants’ solutions perform much
worse than ensembles of these solutions [19]. The team composition however is completely decided
by the participants, with minimal involvement of the designers (and no change in reward structures).
Thus, gaining insight into team formation and dynamics is key to the success of these platforms;
this sentiment is echoed in a report from the National Academy of Sciences highlighting the need
to find ways to foster team effectiveness [5].
⋆ A preliminary version of this work was presented at WINE 2018, and accompanied by a one-page extended abstract
[14].
Our work focuses on the use of Bayesian persuasion (sometimes referred to as strategic in-
formation revelation, or signaling) for incentivizing team formation. The main idea is that many
strategic settings have an inherent information asymmetry, where the principal has more informa-
tion than the participating agents. By controlling the release of this information, the principal can
influence agents’ decisions. For example, for the formation of course assignment groups, suppose
the instructor first administers a test to get a more accurate read on each student’s true aptitude
for the course. How she releases the results of this test will affect what teams are formed. If she
chooses not to release any information, then the students will pair up as before according to their
perceived aptitudes; if she releases the scores as is, the students will then pair up according to these
true aptitudes, leading to even more imbalanced teams. The main idea we pursue in this work is
to understand if there is any way of releasing the scores that can lead to more balanced teams; in
other words, we want to know how the principal can influence endogenous team formation using
strategic signaling.
1.1 Overview of Model and Results
We consider a setting with n agents who endogenously form teams, leading to some utility for both
the agents and the principal. For convenience, we focus here on teams of two agents (i.e., matchings)
– the basic setting and questions (as well as many of our results) however are more general. The
teams are chosen endogenously by the agents, in the form of a stable matching ; the principal however
can influence agents’ preferences via strategic release of information.
In more detail: each agent has an intrinsic (numerical) type, drawn from some publicly-known
prior. Crucially, we assume the types are known to the principal, but unknown to the agents.
Moreover, an agent’s utility is an increasing function of her and her teammates’ types, while the
principal’s utility function depends on the set of resulting teams, and favors having more ‘balanced’
teams. For convenience, we focus on settings with a binary type-space {0, 1}, and a constant number
(K) of prior distributions. Our insights however generalize to other settings, as we discuss below.
The main tool available to the principal is Bayesian persuasion, whereby she can leverage her
information asymmetry by committing to a signaling scheme based on the realized types. This sig-
naling scheme can be verified by the agents (for example, the principal can commit to using an
open-source script that inputs the true types and generates the signal). Thus, the signal affects the
agents’ posterior over the types, which then determines their choice of teams via a stable matching.
The aim of the principal is to choose a signaling scheme which is individually rational (i.e., partici-
pation constraints, wherein all agents are weakly better off by agreeing to receive the signal), and
for which the resulting stable matching maximizes the principal’s utility.
In the context of the above setting, our contributions are summarized as follows:
1. We characterize the optimal signaling schemes in the form of a linear program which implements
a persuasive recommendation – a consistent posterior ranking of the agents. This LP however
has Ω(nn) variables, and hence is computationally intractable.
2. In settings where agents are self-agnostic (i.e., are uncertain even about their own type), we
demonstrate a signaling mechanism which (i) under uniform priors (i.e., K = 1 clusters, wherein
agents have i.i.d. types) achieves the optimal in hindsight, and (ii) for finite K, is asymptotically
optimal (in n) compared to the best signaling scheme.
3. In settings where agents are self-aware (i.e., know their own type), we show that even for i.i.d.
types (K = 1), no signaling scheme can do better than random matching (i.e., not releasing any
information) while preserving participation constraints.
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To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to formally characterize the effectiveness of signaling
mechanisms for team formation. Moreover, despite the simplicity of our setting, our work provides
important insights and techniques for the design of Bayesian persuasion schemes for general team
formation settings. Our results indicate the importance of self-awareness in determining the success
of signaling mechanisms, and provides a novel policy for self-agnostic settings based on inter-cluster
pairing of type-profiles. Moreover, showing this strategy is asymptotically optimal requires a novel
dual-certification argument, which may be useful in related settings.
1.2 Related work
Our work locates itself squarely within the framework of Bayesian persuasion, a topic which has
garnered much recent attention. We briefly summarize some of the main ideas of this topic below;
for a more detailed survey of this literature, refer [10] for a survey).
The basic idea originates from the seminal work of Kamenica and Gentzkow [15], which considers
a principal who commits to a signaling policy which maps the true state of the world to a signal
sent to a single agent, and derives conditions on the principal’s utility function under which she
strictly benefits from persuasion. Going beyond, Kremer et al. [16] consider a dynamic setting in
which agents arrive sequentially and choose an action with an unknown (but deterministic) reward.
The goal of the principal is to find the optimal disclosure (or recommendation) policy of a planner
who wants to maximize social welfare, whereas agents simply seek to maximize their own expected
reward. The authors show that the optimal policy is a threshold policy which explores as much as
possible, and then always recommends the best action, and obtain a similar near-optimal threshold
policy with stochastic rewards; recent papers greatly generalize this line of work [18,2].
In the context of multi-agent settings with no externalities, Arieli and Babichenko [1] look at a
model where the principal is trying to persuade individuals to adopt a product by sending private
signals. They characterize the optimal policy for supermodular, submodular, and supermajority
utility functions of the principal. More recent work has been devoted to proving hardness or inefficacy
results for finding the optimal information disclosure policy in such settings [9,11].
In contrast to these papers, our work involves a multi-agent scenario with externalities – in other
words, not only is the principal playing a game with multiple agents, but the agents are playing
a game amongst themselves. Recent work has looked at related models in the context of routing
and queueing games. In [4], the authors present hardness results on public signaling for Bayesian
two-player zero-sum games and Bayesian network routing games; more recent works [7,20] consider
practical variants of such policies in restricted settings.
In the setting of strategic delay announcements for queueing, [17] show that when the principal
is a revenue maximizer, a binary signaling mechanism with a threshold structure is optimal. Our
work however is, to best of our knowledge, the first to consider the problem of finding the optimal
signaling policy for team formation.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Basic Setup
We consider a setting with a principal and n agents (where n is even), where the agents endogenously
partition themselves into two-member teams. Each agent i ∈ [n] has a random type θi ∈ {0, 1},
which can be interpreted as her intrinsic ability to perform the task at hand. We use Θ , {0, 1}n
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to denote the space of type-profiles of all n agents. Additionally, we use M to denote the set of all
matchings. Finally, for any given type-profile θ ∈ Θ, we define h(θ) =
∑
i 1θi=1 to be the number
of agents with type 1 (i.e., ‘high’ type) in θ, and ℓ(θ) = n − h(θ) to be the number of agents with
type 0 (i.e., ‘low’ type) in θ.
Each agent’s payoff depends only on her own type and that of her match. We denote the utility
function of agent i as ui : {0, 1} × {0, 1} → R, and assume they obey the following properties:
i. symmetric (i.e., u(θi, θj) = u(θj , θi))
ii. strictly increasing in each type (i.e., u(θ, 0) < u(θ, 1) and u(0, θ) < u(1, θ))
iii. strictly concave (i.e., u(0, 0) + u(1, 1) < 2u(1, 0)).
The principal’s utility f : Θ×M→ R is a function of the agents’ types, as well as the matching
chosen by the agents. As with the agents’ utilities, we assume f is symmetric in each type (i.e.,
anonymous), and hence, only depends on the number of matches between two type 1 agents m11,
two type 0 agents m00, and one type 1 and one type 0 agent m10. Note though that, for any given
type profile θ, the vector (m00,m10,m11) (i.e., over all choices of teams) has only a single degree of
freedom, and in particular, maximizing (resp. minimizing) m10 is equivalent to minimizing (resp.
maximizing) m11 and m00. Moreover, note that if f is nondecreasing in m11 or m00, then the
agents’ and the principal’s incentives are aligned, and thus the principal can reveal θ to realize the
optimal matching. The tension arises because the principal wants teams which are more ‘balanced’
– to model this, we henceforth assume that f is strictly increasing in m10 (equivalently, strictly
decreasing in m00 and m11).
In the spirit of the framework used in other work on optimal signaling [15,11,1], we assume that
the type of each agent i is drawn independently from a Ber(pi) distribution, and denote λ to be the
product distribution over Θ. We assume that this distribution is known to all agents, and that each
agent’s realized type is unknown to other agents. On the other hand, we assume that the principal
has full knowledge of the realized types θ = (θ1, . . . , θn). Finally, with regard to what an agent
knows about her own type, we consider two cases: one in which agents are self-aware, and one in
which agents are self-agnostic.
Definition 1. A self-aware agent is an agent who knows her own type. A self-agnostic agent is an
agent who does not know her own type.
For example, a self-agnostic student in a course is one who has no prior experience in the subject,
and hence no idea of her aptitude for it; on the other hand, a self-aware student has some idea of
her abilities, perhaps based on experience of similar courses or independent reading.
We assume the principal has the ability to commit to an information disclosure policy – also
termed a signaling scheme – which is a mapping from the realized state of nature θ to a signal
of some sort. For example, in crowdsourcing platforms, the principal can administer a test to each
participant, and choose whether or not (and how) to reveal their scores. We note that this signaling
policy may be randomized. In this paper, we restrict the principal to public signaling schemes, i.e.,
the principal sends the same signal to all agents. Although private signaling schemes have been
considered in other settings (for example, signaling in games without externalities [11]), it is unclear
how an agent can reason about the beliefs and abilities of other agents when evaluating a match.
Formally, the sequence of events is as follows. First, the principal commits to a randomized
signaling policy φ : Θ → Σ, where Σ is the set of all possible signals σ. Next, the state of nature
θ ∈ Θ is drawn from the prior distribution λ, and the types of all agents are revealed to the
principal. The principal then draws a signal σ from the distribution φ(θ), and broadcasts it to the
agents. The agents in turn compute a posterior on the state of nature θ given the signal σ. They
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compare their optimal match given σ and their optimal match without σ, and choose the agent to
match with which maximizes their expected utility. As a result, a matching m ∈ M is induced. The
optimization problem that we are interested in is finding the signaling scheme that maximizes the
principal’s expected utility.
2.2 Solution Concept
We assume that agents are expected utility maximizers. Upon receiving the signal from the principal,
self-agnostic agents form a posterior on the state of nature θ, given the common filtration Fσ
induced by the public signal σ. A subgame is consequently induced, in which each agent maintains
a rank ordered preference list over all other agents, and chooses to match with the agent who
maximizes her expected utility, given her available information. Formally, each agent i computes
E [u(θi, θj) | Fσ] for each agent j 6= i, and maintains the preference list j1 < j2 < . . . < . . . jn−1 such
that E [u(θi, θj1) | Fσ] < E [u(θi, θj2) | Fσ] < . . . < . . .E
[
u(θi, θjn−1) | Fσ
]
.
In the case where agents are self-agnostic, the public signal σ induces a common filtration Fσ
among all agents. Consequently, there will be a common ranking of the agents, and the preference
profile of each agent is the sub-ranking that does not include her. This resulting preference pro-
file induces a matching m.1 A natural solution concept for endogenous team formation is that of
stability [12]:
Definition 2. A matching m is stable if it has no blocking pair, i.e., there exist no two agents who
are not matched together but would prefer to be matched together.
Stability is a natural desideratum to impose on team formation. In addition, however, we also
need to ensure that agents are willing to participate in any signaling scheme proposed by the
principal. Note that in the absence of a signal, agents can still compute E[u(θi, θj)], and form
a preference profile and resulting matching m(∅) (where ∅ refers to the absence of signal). This
suggests the following natural participation constraint:
Definition 3. A signaling scheme is individually rational if it ensures that each agent is weakly
better off under any stable matching m induced by the signaling scheme as compared to her utility
under the baseline stable matching m(∅).
Thus, our aim is to design individually rational signaling schemes so as to maximize the prin-
cipal’s utility under an induced stable matching. The following proposition helps further simplify
this, by showing that every agent’s ranking over other agents induced by a signal σ is identical to
the ranking induced by the conditional expectation over agent types.
Proposition 1. Given the filtration Fσ, the expected utility of agent i from matching with agent j
is monotone increasing in the expected type of agent j.
Proof. Define Eσ[·] = E [· | Fσ ]. Now consider Eσ [u(θi, θj)], for arbitrary j ∈ [n]. We have:
Eσ [u(θi, θj)] =u(0, 0)Pσ [θi = 0, θj = 0] + u(1, 1)Pσ [θi = 1, θj = 1]
+ u(1, 0)
(
Pσ [θi = 1, θj = 0] + Pσ [θi = 0, θj = 1]
)
=u(0, 0)Pσ [θi = 0 | θj = 0]Pσ [θj = 0] + u(1, 1)Pσ [θi = 1 | θj = 1]Pσ [θj = 1]
+ u(1, 0)
(
Pσ [θi = 0 | θj = 1]Pσ [θj = 1] + Pσ [θi = 1 | θj = 0]Pσ [θj = 0]
)
1 The induced matching m may not be unique, since the ordering is not necessarily strict. We assume that agents
break ties in favor of the principal.
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Define q = Pσ [θj = 1] = Eσ [θj], and (p0, p1) such that pk = Pσ [θi = 1 | θj = k]. Additionally, let
g(q, p0, p1) = Eσ [u(θi, θj)]. Substituting above, we get:
g(q, p0, p1) = u(1, 1)p1q + u(1, 0) ((1− p0)q + p1(1− q)) + u(0, 0)(1 − p1)(1− q)
Our goal is to show that g(q, p0, p1) is monotone increasing in q. For this, we take the partial
derivative with respect to q:
∂g
∂q
= u(1, 1)p1 + u(1, 0)(1 − p0 − p1)− u(0, 0)(1 − p0)
= p1 (u(1, 1) − u(1, 0)) + (1− p0)(u(1, 0) − u(0, 0)) ≥ 0,
where the inequality follows from the fact that u(1, 1) ≥ u(1, 0) ≥ u(0, 0).
In the absence of signal, the strategy of a self-agnostic agent is obvious. Since θj ∼ Ber(pj) for
all j ∈ [n], we have that E [θj] = pj. Thus, each agent’s preference profile results by ordering agents
according to p(1) < p(2) < . . . < p(n−1), and the resulting stable matching is what we define above
as m(∅). Moreover, given a rank-order of agents a < b < c < d < . . . m < n, the resulting teams
(formed via stable matching) are (a, b), (c, d), . . . , (m,n). Thus, under any signal σ, agents pair up
sequentially according to the rank-order of their conditional expected types.
2.3 Finding the Optimal Policy
To summarize from above: the goal of the principal is to find a signaling policy that induces a
stable matching and maximizes her expected utility. Additionally, the signaling policy must satisfy
an individual rationality constraint, such that the agents are better off following the signal than
ignoring it. Let m(σ) denote the matching induced when the principal sends signal σ, and mi(σ)
denote the agent that agent i is matched with in matching m. Similarly, mi(∅) is the agent that
agent i is matched with in the absence of a signal. The principal’s optimization problem is given by
max
φ
E [f(θ,m(σ))]
s.t. m(σ) is stable ∀ σ ∈ Σ
E
[
θmi(σ) | σ
]
≥ E
[
θmi(∅)
]
∀ σ ∈ Σ,∀ i ∈ [n]
(1)
where the maximization is over the set of all randomized maps φ from type-profiles θ to signals σ,
and the expectations are taken over the joint distribution of (σ, θ) induced by φ.
A standard revelation-principle style argument tells us that there exists an optimal signaling
policy that is straightforward and persuasive [15,11,1]. A persuasive signaling policy is a policy for
which the induced actions form a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. A straightforward signaling policy
corresponds to space of signals equaling the agents’ action space. In our setting, a straightforward
signaling scheme is one that signals a matching for a given realization θ. Additionally, by Proposi-
tion 1, matchings are induced by a rank ordered preference list of agents’ expected posterior types.
Combining these three facts, we get that it is sufficient to restrict our attention to signals that are
rank-orderings of agents according to expected posterior type.
We first need some additional notation. Let Σ now denote the set of all orderings (or permuta-
tions) over the n agents. We use the notation σi to denote the identity of the ith-placed individual
with respect to the ordering σ. Additionally, σi(θ) denotes the type of agent σi for the specific
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realization θ. We abuse notation and use σm(i) to denote the agent that the ith agent in ordering
σ is matched to. Finally, σm(i)(θ) denotes the type of the match of agent i under ordering σ of a
given realization θ. The following example helps clarify this notation.
Example 1. Suppose n = 4, with agents A, B, C and D. Consider realization θ = (θA, θB, θC , θD) =
(1, 1, 0, 0), and σ = (A < C < B < D). Recall that for a given rank-order, the agents pair up
sequentially; Thus, σ(θ) = (1, 0, 1, 0), σ2 = C, σ2(θ) = 0. Similarly, σm(2) = A, and σm(2)(θ) = 1.
Proposition 2 now gives us a tractable way of representing a given signal is persuasive, i.e., that
the matching induced by the announced ordering is indeed stable.
Proposition 2. Suppose it is optimal for agents to follow the signal announced by the principal.
The matching induced by the announced ordering is stable if and only if the following holds:
E
[
σm(i)(θ) | Fσ
]
≥ E
[
σj(θ) | Fσ
]
∀ i ∈ [n− 1],∀j s.t σj > σm(i), σj 6= σi. (2)
Proof. ( =⇒ ) : Suppose constraint (2) is satisfied. For agent i = σ1, argmaxj E [θj | Fσ ] = σ
2.
Similarly, for agent i′ = σ2, argmaxj E [θj | Fσ] = σ
1. Thus, agents σ1 and σ2 will match in m(σ).
Replicating this logic, agents will never want to match with agents who are ranked below their
match which ordering σ induced. Though constraint (2) leaves open the possibility that an agent
may want to match with σj
∗
such that σj
∗
< σm(i) (i.e. ranked above their match in the above
ordering), such a match would never occur since σj
∗
has no incentive to deviate and match with
someone ranked lower than her own partner. Thus, the resulting matching is stable.
( ⇐= ) : Suppose there exists an ordering σ and two agents σ(i), σ(j) such that σ(i) < σ(j)
but E
[
σi(θ) | Fσ
]
< E
[
σj(θ) | Fσ
]
. Since E
[
σi(θ) | Fσ
]
< E
[
σj(θ) | Fσ
]
, agent σm(i) would rather
match with agent σj. Additionally, since E
[
σm(i)(θ) | Fσ
]
≥ E
[
σm(j)(θ) | Fσ
]
, agent σj would
rather match with agent σm(i) than agent σm(j). Thus, (σm(i), σj) constitute a blocking pair, and
m(σ) is unstable.
Let m00(σ(θ)) denote the number of ‘0-0’ matches induced when ordering σ is announced for
realization θ. We abuse notation and write the principal’s utility function f (m00 (σ(θ))) since, for
a given realization θ and an ordering σ, there is a one-to-one correspondence between m00, and
m10 and m11. Moreover, under our assumption that f is strictly decreasing in m00(σ(θ)), for all
θ, it suffices to minimize the expected number of matches composed of two type 0 individuals,
i.e., maxφ E [f (m00 (σ(θ)))] ≡ minφ E [m00(σ(θ))]. Putting this all together, we obtain a concise
representation of the principal’s optimization problem as follows:
min
φ
E [m00(σ(θ))]
s.t. E
[
σm(i)(θ) | Fσ
]
≥ E
[
σj(θ) | Fσ
]
∀ σ ∈ Σ,∀ i ∈ [n− 1],∀ j s.t. σj > σm(i), σj 6= σi
E
[
σm(i)(θ) | Fσ
]
≥ E
[
θmi(∅)
]
∀ σ ∈ Σ,∀ i ∈ [n].
(P )
We henceforth denote the optimal value of the principal’s optimization (P ) as OPT .
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3 Main Results
We now present our main results, wherein we characterize optimal and near-optimal signaling poli-
cies in two different scenarios: with self-agnostic agents (i.e., those who do not know their own
types), and with self-aware agents (i.e., those who know their own types). In the former scenario,
we first consider a setting with symmetric agents who have i.i.d. types (drawn from a Ber(p) distri-
bution), wherein we provide an optimal signaling policy. We then generalize this to a setting with
a constant number (K) of clusters of symmetric agents, with the types of agents in cluster k ∈ [K]
drawn from a Ber(pk) distribution – here, we provide a signaling scheme which is asymptotically
optimal in n (for fixed K). On the other hand, in settings with self-aware agents, we show that no
individually rational signalling scheme can do better than having no signal.
3.1 Self-Agnostic Agents
When agents do not have access to their own types, they share a common posterior induced by the
announced ordering σ. Thus, the set of ‘persuasiveness’ constraints in Problem (P ) reduces to:
E
[
σi(θ) | σ
]
≥ E
[
σi+1(θ) | σ
]
∀ σ ∈ Σ,∀ i ∈ [n− 1].
Note that the above constraints require that, for two agents matched together, in expectation
the agent who comes first in the ranking must indeed have a higher type than the agent who comes
second. Adding this constraint is without loss of generality due to the assumption that agents’
utilities are anonymous.
Let xθ,σ denote the probability of announcing ordering σ when the realization is θ. We consider
the relaxed problem which ignores the individual rationality constraints of agents, and consequently
is an upper bound on (P ):
min
{xθ,σ}
∑
θ∈Θ
∑
σ∈Σ
λ(θ)xθ,σm00(σ(θ))
s.t.
∑
θ∈Θ
λ(θ)xθ,σσ
i(θ) ≥
∑
θ∈Θ
λ(θ)xθ,σσ
i+1(θ) ∀ σ ∈ Σ,∀ i ∈ [n− 1]
∑
σ∈Σ
xθ,σ = 1 ∀ θ ∈ Θ
xθ,σ ≥ 0 ∀ θ ∈ Θ,∀ σ ∈ Σ
(P˜ )
Let ˜OPT denote the optimal value of (P˜ ). This LP is clearly computationally intractable, even
for small values of n, since it is exponentially large in both the number of variables (of which there
are n!2n) and the number of constraints (of which there are O(n!2n)).
Single cluster Despite the complexity of the above LP, we now show that for the special case of
i.i.d. agent types (i.e., where all agents form a single cluster with the same prior on their types), we
can actually demonstrate an optimal signaling scheme. Moreover, the resulting utility obtained by
the principal matches the first-best solution, i.e., the utility of the optimal matching ignoring the
individual rationality and persuasiveness constraints.
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Theorem 1. In the single cluster setting where all agents have i.i.d. types, for any realized type-
profile θ, the principal can achieve m00(σ
∗(θ)) = min
σ
m00(σ(θ)). Thus,
OPT = E
[
min
σ
m00(σ(θ))
]
.
Proof outline. To prove the theorem, we first solve the relaxed problem (P˜ ), and show that, for all
realizations θ, the principal can construct a scheme such that the number of matches between two
type 0 agents is as small as possible. We henceforth refer to this scheme as First Best (denoted
FB) since this is indeed the best achievable utility without strategic considerations. We then show
that this signaling scheme satisfies the individual rationality constraint for all agents, and hence is
feasible for (P ). We provide a brief outline of the scheme here, but owing to space constraints, defer
the complete proof to the appendix.
The main intuition behind designing our persuasive signaling scheme to achieve the first-best
outcome is to pair up type-profiles for a given signal σ such that together they satisfy the rank-
order in the signal. In particular, since agents are self-agnostic, we can leverage this by pairing up
type-profiles such that for each type-profile θ under which two agents of different types are matched,
there exists a profile θ¯, realized with equal probability, in which the same agents are matched, but
have their types flipped. This ensures that the incentive constraints in (P˜ ) are satisfied, as we are
essentially incentivizing a strong agent to accept being matched with weak agent via a promise of
matching with a strong agent when they themselves are weak.
Finally, the fact that the above scheme satisfies the participation constraints depends crucially
on the concavity of the agents’ utility function. The intuition behind this is that under a strictly
concave u(·), the additional value of a ‘1-1’ match compared to a ‘1-0’ match is less than the value
of being in a ‘1-0’ match than being in a ‘0-0’ match. Consequently, having an assurance of being
in a 0-0 team as rarely as possible dominates the match under m(∅).
To summarize, Theorem 1 states that when agents have i.i.d. types and are agnostic of their
own types, the principal has enough freedom to match as many type 1 agents with type 0 agents
as possible, and to do so such that (i) the declared rank-ordering is ‘persuasive’ and (ii) agents are
better off under this mechanism than under their myopic strategy. In the next section, we use the
FB signaling scheme as a critical primitive for the multi-cluster setting.
Multiple clusters A natural next question to ask would be how well the principal can do if
there are multiple clusters of agents, with agents within each cluster drawing i.i.d. types. Formally,
suppose there are K ≥ 2 groups of agents, with the types of the nk agents in each group k drawn
independently from a Ber(pk) distribution. We assume that pk 6= pk′ for all k 6= k
′. Additionally,
we denote ℓk(θ), hk(θ) the number of agents with a true type of 0 and 1, respectively, in cluster k.
Consider the scheme that only matches agents within their own clusters, and does so using the
FB signaling scheme from above; we refer to this scheme as ‘Cluster First Best’, denoted as FBC .
Given Theorem 1, this scheme is feasible, and thus gives us an upper bound on OPT . However, the
scheme is sub-optimal for K ≥ 2 clusters, since it misses opportunities to match excess type 1 and
type 0 agents across clusters, an event which occurs a non-trivial number of times.
Despite this, as the number of agents n scales, while keeping the number of clusters constant,
we show that the Cluster First Best policy gets arbitrarily close to the optimal solution for K = 2
clusters.
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Theorem 2. For K = 2 clusters and n1, n2 such that
√
lnn1
n1
≤ |p1−1/2|,
√
lnn2
n2
≤ |p2−1/2|, then
Cluster First Best achieves o(1) regret (with respect to n).
As noted above, Cluster First Best is suboptimal since it misses occasions where it could induce
agents of different types to match across different clusters. The first important realization is that
the only realizations for which Cluster First Best is suboptimal are realizations for which there is
an excess of type 1 agents in one cluster, and an excess of type 0 agents in the other cluster. For all
other realizations, Cluster First Best is in fact optimal.
For the settings where there are potential gains from matching agents across clusters, we can no
longer use the first-best solution as a benchmark. To show that the FBC policy is asymptotically
optimal in these cases is much more challenging. We provide a brief sketch of this proof below, and
defer the formal proof to the appendix.
Proof outline. The proof of the theorem considers three regions of the (p1, p2) space:
(i) p1 > p2 > 1/2 , (ii) p2 < p1 < 1/2 , (iii) p2 < 1/2 < p1.
2
Moreover, via standard measure concentration arguments, we can restrict ourselves to considering
realizations that lie in a ‘typical set’ (following standard information theoretic definitions; cf. [6]):
A(n1,n2)ǫ1,ǫ2 = {θ : |h1(θ)− n1p1| ≤ ǫ1n1, |h2(θ)− n2p2| ≤ ǫ2n2} .
Note that for sufficiently large n, the realized type-profiles in A
(n1,n2)
ǫ1,ǫ2 are such that h1(θ), h2(θ) are
in the same orthant as n1p1, n2p2, respectively.
Our proof for cases (i) and (ii) relies on the key observation that in these regions, the induced
matching under Cluster First Best is exactly First Best. In Case (i), for example, all realizations
in A
(n1,n2)
ǫ1,ǫ2 will have an excess of type 1 agents in each cluster. Thus, if we simply match optimally
within each cluster, only type 1 agents remain to be matched, and we could not have done better.
A similar argument holds for Case (ii). We finish our argument by using concentration inequalities
for large enough n1, n2.
The main technical challenge in the proof is in dealing with Case (iii). Here, we exhibit a dual
certificate solution that gives a lower bound on the optimal solution for the restricted space A
(n1,n2)
ǫ1,ǫ2 .
In particular, we construct a feasible solution for the dual LP of (P˜ ) whose value is exactly that of
Cluster First Best. The construction relies on an intricate inductive argument, the details of which
we defer to the appendix.
Finally, again using standard concentration inequalities, we show that, in going from the typical
set A
(n1,n2)
ǫ1,ǫ2 to the entire space Θ, the lower bound decreases at most by o(1) for large enough
n1, n2.
Moreover, Theorem 2 can be extended to provide a similar result for K > 2 clusters.
Corollary 1. ForK > 2 clusters with n1, . . . , nK agents, such that
√
lnn1
n1
≤ |p1−1/2|, . . . ,
√
lnnK
nK
≤
|pK − 1/2|, Cluster First Best achieves o(1) regret.
The proof of the corollary requires an additional induction on the number of clusters. The
high-level idea remains: for large clusters, the number of type 1 agents in each cluster is in the
(n1p1, . . . , nKpK) orthant with high probability. Thus, there do not exist enough realizations in
2 Restricting to p1 > p2 is without loss of generality since we can relabel the clusters.
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other orthants that would ‘fix’ the excesses in this high probability orthant. We defer the formal
proof to the appendix.
Theorem 2 and Corollary 1 tell us that, though sophisticated information disclosure policies can
induce agents to pair with agents in other clusters, for a large enough number of agents, the fraction
of type 1 agents in the ‘stronger’ clusters concentrates so much so that the principal has no leverage
to induce them to match with an agent in a weaker cluster. Thus, the principal does not gain a
significant amount from more sophisticated signaling schemes, and Cluster First Best is close to
optimal.
3.2 Self-Aware Agents
We now turn our attention to settings where agents are aware of their own types. We use the
same solution concepts as for self-agnostic agents: individual rationality and stability. In this case,
however, the filtration induced by the signal is no longer common to all agents, since they have
the additional knowledge of their own type. Consequently, stability is a much more difficult goal to
achieve in this scenario.
Following a similar argument as in Section 3.1, the principal’s optimization problem in the
setting with self-aware agents can be written as:
min
{xθ,σ}
∑
θ∈Θ
∑
σ∈Σ
λ(θ)xθ,σm00 (σ(θ))
s.t.
∑
θ:σi(θ)=1
λ(θ)xθ,σσ
m(i)(θ) ≥
∑
θ:σi(θ)=1
λ(θ)xθ,σσ
j(θ) ∀ σ ∈ Σ,∀ i ∈ [n− 1],∀ j > m(i)
∑
θ:σi(θ)=0
λ(θ)xθ,σσ
m(i)(θ) ≥
∑
θ:σi(θ)=0
λ(θ)xθ,σσ
j(θ) ∀ σ ∈ Σ,∀ i ∈ [n− 1],∀ j > m(i)
E
[
σm(i)(θ) | θi, σ
]
≥ E
[
θmi(∅) | θi
]
∀ σ ∈ Σ,∀ i ∈ [n], θi ∈ {0, 1}∑
σ∈Σ
xθ,σ = 1 ∀ θ ∈ Θ
xθ,σ ≥ 0 ∀ θ ∈ Θ,∀ σ ∈ Σ
(3)
Intuitively, the principal has less leverage when agents know their own types than in the scenario
with self-agnostic agents, since she cannot compensate for the times where a type 1 agent was
matched with a type 0 agent by the times where this same agent was type 0 and was matched with
a type 1 agent instead. Additionally, from a computational point of view, the optimization problem
appears more difficult to solve since the information disclosure policy now has to take into account
the different priors that agents have over one another. This point however turns out to be moot, as
we show below that this setting suffers from a strong impossibility result:
Theorem 3. Consider a single cluster of agents with i.i.d. types. If the agents are self-aware, then
no individually rational signaling policy can perform better than random.
Proof. Suppose that each agent has i.i.d. type drawn from a Ber(p) distribution, and is aware of
her own type. Now consider any signaling policy S. The individual rationality constraint imposes
that the expected utility of each agent i under S must be at least her expected utility when matched
with a random agent.
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Suppose agent i is a type 1 agent. Under her myopic strategy, agent i’s expected utility is:
E [ui | θi = 1] = pu(1, 1) + (1− p)u(1, 0)
= u(1, 0) + p (u(1, 1) − u(1, 0)) .
Let pS denote the probability that agent i is matched with another type 1 agent under signaling
policy S. Under S, agent i’s expected utility is:
E [ui | θi = 1,S] = pSu(1, 1) + (1− pS)u(1, 0)
= u(1, 0) + pS (u(1, 1) − u(1, 0)) .
To satisfy the agent rationality constraint, S must satisfy:
u(1, 0) + pS (u(1, 1) − u(1, 0)) ≥ u(1, 0) + p (u(1, 1) − u(1, 0)) .
Equivalently, since u(1, 1) > u(1, 0), S must satisfy pS ≥ p.
Recall the objective function from Problem (P ):∑
θ∈Θ
∑
σ∈Σ
λ(θ)xθ,σm00(σ(θ)),
where m00(σ(θ)) denotes the number of matches of two type 0 agents when signal σ is announced.
Moreover, since (m00,m10,m11) is one-dimensional, it is enough for us to reason about the number
of matches between two type 1 agents. Now note that we can expand m11 (σ(θ)) as:
m11(σ(θ)) =
1
2
n∑
i=1
1{σi(θ) = 1, σm(i)(θ) = 1}.
Plugging this into our objective of interest, we obtain:
∑
θ∈Θ
∑
σ∈Σ
λ(θ)xθ,σ
n∑
i=1
1
2
1{σi(θ) = 1, σm(i)(θ) = 1} =
1
2
n∑
i=1
p

 ∑
θ:θi=1
∑
σ
λ(θ)xθ,σσ
m(i)(θ)


=
1
2
p
(
n∑
i=1
pS
)
≥
1
2
p
(
n∑
i=1
p
)
(4)
=
np2
2
,
where inequality (4) follows from the individual rationality constraint. This lower bound is achieved
by matching each type 1 agent with another type 1 agent with probability p, which is equivalent to
having agents match randomly.
Moreover, given Theorem 3, the following corollary is immediate, since the K = 1 cluster case
is one where the principal has the most leverage.
Corollary 2. In a setting with self-aware agents belonging to K ≥ 1 clusters, any individually
rational signaling policy cannot achieve a utility that is better than that achieved with no signalling
(i.e., wherein agents pair randomly within clusters).
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4 Extensions
Although our results consider the setting in which agents’ types are binary, the methods easily
extend to more general discrete distributions (e.g., multinomial) by carefully defining analogs for
the principal’s and agents’ utility functions. For example, in the self-agnostic case with one cluster,
with linear and symmetric agent utilities, and principal’s utility that is increasing in the difference
between match types, a nearly identical construction gives us that First Best is achievable by the
principal. The setting with many clusters requires additional assumptions on the distributions from
which each cluster is drawn. Namely, for binary types, our results relied heavily on the fact that
p1 > p2. Intuitively, first-order stochastic dominance should be sufficient for similar results to hold
(i.e., Cluster First Best achieves sublinear regret).
Another important setting for which our techniques should extend is that of bipartite matching.
One motivating example is that of matching riders and drivers on ridesharing platforms. On these
platforms, both riders and drivers have ratings. Companies such as Lyft and Uber have an incentive
to want diverse matches, since matches of poorly rated riders to poorly rated drivers result in
negative experiences for all users, and are likely to create self-reinforcing cycles of poor ratings.
If there was a way for the platform to obtain private information on each side (say, selectively
display some of the ratings), then using our techniques, there is hope for more diverse matches to
be induced.
In the bipartite matching problem, the one-cluster analog would be each side of the platform
drawn from a Ber(pleft), Ber(pright) distribution. Again, an analogous construction using the ‘com-
plement’ of a realized type profile imply similar results. Further, the case with multiple clusters
on each side lends itself to the intuitive result that the platform cannot benefit from having, for
example, the highest ranked cluster on the left match with any other cluster than the highest ranked
cluster on the right. We leave the derivation of this very natural and important extension as future
work.
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A Omitted Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1:
We first show that solving the relaxed LP (P˜ ) allows the principal to achieve the minimum
number of matches between two type 0 agents, for each realization θ.
Lemma 1.
˜OPT = E
[
min
σ
m00(σ(θ))
]
Proof. The proof is constructive. Let ℓ(θ), h(θ) denote the number of agents of type 0 and type 1,
respectively. Clearly, we have that
ℓ(θ) = n− h(θ).
Case 1: h(θ) ∈ {0, n}
When h(θ) = 0, for all σ ∈ Σ, m00(σ(θ)) = n/2. Thus, the principal is indifferent among
orderings, and can choose an arbitrary ordering σ˜ and announce it with probability 1 (xθ,σ˜ = 1).
Similarly, when h(θ) = n, m00(σ(θ)) = 0 for all σ ∈ Σ. As in the case above, the principal can
choose an arbitrary ordering to announce with probability 1.
Case 2: h(θ) ∈ {1, n − 1}
When h(θ) = 1, m00(σ(θ)) = n/2− 1 for all σ. Additionally, when h(θ) = n− 1, m00(σ(θ)) = 0
for all σ. As in Case 1, the principal is indifferent between orderings.
Let σtruth denote any ordering that correctly orders agent for a realization θ.
3 Pick an arbitrary
σtruth and set xθ,σtruth = 1.
Case 3: 1 < h(θ) < n− 1
We first illustrate our construction via an example.
Example 2. Consider θ = (θA, θB , θC , θD, θE , θF ) = (1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0). Then, σ
∗ = (A < B < C < E <
D < F ) achieves zero ‘0-0’ matches. Consider θ¯ = (1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1). Announcing the same signal σ∗
for this realization also achieves zero ‘0-0’ matches. Additionally, note that since h(θ) = h(θ¯) and
agents have i.i.d. types, λ(θ) = λ(θ¯). Suppose that, given either of these realizations (and for no
other realization), the principal announces σ∗ with probability 1. Then, when agents receive the
signal σ∗, the posterior probability of being in realization θ is equal to the posterior probability of
being in θ¯. Thus, the expected posterior types of agents A and B is 1; the expected posterior type
of all other agents is 0.5, and the persuasiveness constraints are thus respected.
In the same spirit as the above example, our goal will be to find a realization θ¯ with which to
pair θ such that σ∗(θ) ∈ argmin
σ
m00(σ(θ)), and σ
∗(θ¯) ∈ argmin
σ
m00(σ(θ¯)).
Suppose h(θ) > ℓ(θ), and let e(θ) = h(θ) − ℓ(θ) denote the excess of type 1 agents over type
0 agents. (An entirely analogous construction can be shown to be feasible for h(θ) ≤ ℓ(θ).) Let
ordering σ∗ be any permutation of θ such that type 1 and type 0 individuals are flipped as many
3 Clearly, σtruth depends on the specific realization θ. By abuse of notation and since this is clear from context, we
suppress the argument θ.
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times as possible. That is, for such σ∗, σ∗1(θ) = 1, σ∗2(θ) = 1, . . . , σ∗e(θ)(θ) = 1, and σ∗e(θ)+1(θ) =
1, σ∗e(θ)+2(θ) = 0, . . . , σ∗n−1(θ) = 1, σ∗n(θ) = 0. Clearly, σ∗ ∈ argmin
σ
m00(σ(θ)).
Let θ¯ be the realization with h(θ¯) = h(θ), and such that σ∗1(θ¯) = 1, σ∗2(θ¯) = 1, . . . , σ∗e(θ)(θ¯) = 1,
and σ∗e(θ)+1(θ¯) = 0, σ∗e(θ)+2(θ¯) = 1, . . . , σ∗n−1(θ¯) = 0, σ∗n(θ¯) = 1. This construction also makes it
clear that σ∗ ∈ argmin
σ
m00(σ(θ¯)).
Let xθ,σ∗ = xθ¯,σ∗ = 1. We show that this construction satisfies the set of ‘persuasive’ constraints
of (P˜ ), namely:
∑
θ∈Θ
λ(θ)xθ,σ∗σ
∗i(θ) ≥
∑
θ∈Θ
λ(θ)xθ,σ∗σ
∗i+1(θ) ∀ i ∈ [n− 1]
⇐⇒
∑
θ∈Θ
λ(θ)xθ,σ∗ v¯(σ
∗i(θ)) ≥ 0 ∀ i ∈ [n− 1],
where v¯(σ∗i(θ)) , σ∗i(θ)− σ∗i+1(θ).
For 1 ≤ i ≤ e(θ), all entries of σ∗(θ) and σ∗(θ¯) are 1. Thus, for 1 ≤ i ≤ e(θ)− 1
v¯(σ∗i(θ)) = v¯(σ∗i(θ¯)) = 0 =⇒ λ(θ)xθ,σ∗ v¯(σ
∗i(θ)) + λ(θ¯)xθ¯,σ∗ v¯(σ
∗i(θ¯)) = 0.
As noted in the example, since h(θ¯) = h(θ), and all agent types are drawn independently from
the same Ber(p) distribution, we have λ(θ¯) = λ(θ). Additionally, for i ≥ e(θ) + 1, our construction
is such that v¯(σ∗i(θ)) = −v¯(σ∗i(θ¯)). These two facts together give us that, for i ≥ e(θ) + 1
λ(θ)xθ,σ∗ v¯(σ
∗i(θ)) + λ(θ¯)xθ¯,σ∗ v¯(σ
∗i(θ¯)) = λ(θ)(v¯(σ∗i(θ))− v¯(σ∗i(θ))) = 0.
It remains for us to show that the constraint is satisfied for i = e(θ). By construction, v¯(σ∗e(θ)(θ)) =
0, and v¯(σ∗e(θ)(θ¯)) = 1. Thus:
λ(θ)xθ,σ∗ v¯(σ
∗i(θ)) + λ(θ¯)xθ¯,σ∗ v¯(σ
∗i(θ¯)) = λ(θ)
> 0.
We have shown that we can achieve First Best in our relaxed problem. Although the construction
that we have presented is not necessarily symmetric (i.e., not all type 1 agents have the same
probability of being matched with a type 0 agent), we can randomize this scheme over realizations,
since agents themselves are symmetric. This allows the First Best Scheme to be both symmetric
and feasible in (P˜ ). Thus, henceforth we use the term ‘First Best’ to refer to the symmetric version
of the above signaling scheme.
It remains for us to show that First Best is also individually rational. That is, each agent’s
expected utility under the signaling mechanism is at least as large as her expected utility if she
were to act myopically (which, in the one-cluster case, would be simply to pair up with someone
randomly).
Lemma 2. The First Best signaling scheme is individually rational. Thus, it is optimal for all
agents to follow the principal’s signal.
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Proof. We first derive the expected utility of agent i under her myopic strategy, in the symmetric
case.
E [ui] = E [u | θi = 1]P [θi = 1] + E [u | θi = 0]P [θi = 0]
= p
(
pu(1, 1) + (1− p)u(1, 0)
)
+ (1− p)
(
pu(1, 0) + (1− p)u(0, 0)
)
= p
(
u(1, 1) − (1− p) (u(1, 1) − u(1, 0))
)
+ (1− p)
(
u(0, 0) + p (u(1, 0) − u(0, 0))
)
= pu(1, 1) + (1− p)u(0, 0) + p(1− p)
(
2u(1, 0) − u(1, 1) − u(0, 0)
)
.
Under the First Best scheme M∗, the expected utility of agent i is given by:
E [ui | M
∗] = E
[
θi
(
min
{
1,
ℓ(θ)
h(θ)
}
u(1, 0) +
(
1−min
{
1,
ℓ(θ)
h(θ)
})
u(1, 1)
)
+ (1− θi)
(
min
{
1,
h(θ)
ℓ(θ)
}
u(1, 0) +
(
1−min
{
1,
h(θ)
ℓ(θ)
})
u(0, 0)
) ]
= E
[
θi
(
min
{
1,
ℓ(θ)
h(θ)
}
(u(1, 0) − u(1, 1)) + u(1, 1)
)
+ (1− θi)
(
min
{
1,
h(θ)
ℓ(θ)
}
(u(1, 0) − u(0, 0)) + u(0, 0)
)]
= pu(1, 1) + (1− p)u(0, 0) + (u(1, 0) − u(1, 1))E
[
θimin
{
1,
ℓ(θ)
h(θ)
}]
+ (u(1, 0) − u(0, 0))E
[
(1− θi)min
{
1,
h(θ)
ℓ(θ)
}]
= pu(1, 1) + (1− p)u(0, 0) +
1
n
(2u(1, 0) − u(1, 1) − u(0, 0))E
[
min {i(θ, j(θ))}
]
,
where the last equality results from the easy-to-show fact that in the symmetric setting
E
[
θimin
{
1,
ℓ(θ)
h(θ)
}]
= E
[
(1− θi)min
{
1,
h(θ)
ℓ(θ)
}]
=
1
n
E
[
min{ℓ(θ), h(θ)}
]
.
Since ui is concave, it suffices for us to show that
1
n
E [min{ℓ(θ), h(θ)}] ≥ p(1− p) ∀ n ≥ 2, p ∈ [0, 1].
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We have:
1
n
E [min{ℓ(θ), h(θ)}] =
1
n
n∑
k=1
k
(
n
k
)[
pk(1− p)n−k + (1− p)kpn−k
]
= p(1− p)
n∑
k=1
(
n− 1
k − 1
)[
pk−1(1− p)n−k−1 + (1− p)k−1pn−k−1
]
= p(1− p)
n−1∑
k=0
(
n− 1
k
)[
pk(1− p)n−k−2 + (1− p)kpn−k−2
]
≥ p(1− p)
n−1∑
k=0
(
n− 1
k
)[
pk(1− p)n−k−1 + (1− p)kpn−k−1
]
= p(1− p)
[
n−1∑
k=0
(
n− 1
k
)
pk(1− p)n−1−k +
n−1∑
k=n
(
n− 1
k
)
pk(1− p)n−k−1
]
= p(1− p).
Theorem 1 follows immediately from Lemmas 1 and 2, since we have shown that the optimal
scheme that achieves a lower bound on (P ) is also feasible.
Proof of Theorem 2:
Let A
(n1,n2)
ǫ1,ǫ2 be the set of all realizations θ ∈ Θ such that the number of type 1 individuals in
each cluster is within an ǫ1n1, ǫ2n2 neighborhood of n1p1, n2p2, respectively.
A(n1,n2)ǫ1,ǫ2 = {θ : |h1(θ)− n1p1| ≤ ǫ1n1, |h2(θ)− n2p2| ≤ ǫ2n2} .
We will require ǫ1, ǫ2 to be such that A
(n1,n2)
ǫ1,ǫ2 is entirely contained in the same orthant as
(n1p1, n2p2). That is, ǫ1 ≤ |p1 − 1/2|, ǫ2 ≤ |p2 − 1/2|. Additionally, we define A¯
(n1,n2)
ǫ1,ǫ2 to be the
complement of A
(n1,n2)
ǫ1,ǫ2 .
We begin by finding an upper bound on OPT . Recall that our objective is with respect to m00,
the number of ‘0-0’ matches. We abuse notation use FBC(θ) to denote the value achieved by the
Cluster First Best scheme (optimally matching agents in each cluster), for a fixed realization θ.
Lemma 3.
OPT ≤
∑
θ∈A
(n1,n2)
ǫ1,ǫ2
λ(θ)FBC(θ) + on1+n2(1). (UB)
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Proof. We use the Cluster First Best scheme, which we know to be feasible, for our upper bound.
OPT ≤
∑
θ∈Θ
λ(θ)FBC(θ)
=
∑
θ∈A
(n1,n2)
ǫ1,ǫ2
λ(θ)FBC(θ) +
∑
θ∈A¯
(n1,n2)
ǫ1,ǫ2
λ(θ)FBC(θ)
≤
∑
θ∈A
(n1,n2)
ǫ1,ǫ2
λ(θ)FBC(θ) + n
∑
θ∈A¯
(n1,n2)
ǫ1,ǫ2
λ(θ)
≤
∑
θ∈A
(n1,n2)
ǫ1,ǫ2
λ(θ)FBC(θ) + n
(
e−2ǫ
2
1n1 + e−2ǫ
2
2n2
)
where the second inequality uses the crude upper bound of FBC(θ) ≤ n, and the final inequality
follows from Hoeffding’s inequality [13].
Let ǫ1 =
√
lnn1
n1
, ǫ2 =
√
lnn2
n2
. Since
√
lnn
n
is monotonically decreasing for n ≥ 2, there exists n0
such that for all n1 ≥ n0, n2 ≥ n0, ǫ1 ≤ |p1 − 1/2|, ǫ2 ≤ |p2 − 1/2|, which satisfies our requirement
of staying within the same region as np1, np2. Thus, we obtain the bound:
OPT ≤
∑
θ∈A
(n1,n2)
ǫ1,ǫ2
λ(θ)FBC(θ) + 2n ·
1
n21 + n
2
2
=
∑
θ∈A
(n1,n2)
ǫ1,ǫ2
λ(θ)FBC(θ) +
2(n1 + n2)
n21 + n
2
2
=
∑
θ∈A
(n1,n2)
ǫ1,ǫ2
λ(θ)FBC(θ) + on1+n2(1).
We treat the analysis of the lower bound separately, depending on the orthant in which (p1, p2)
resides: 1. p1 > p2 > 1/2 , 2. p2 < p1 < 1/2 , 3. p2 < 1/2 < p1.
The fact that p1 > p2 is without loss of generality, since we can simply relabel the clusters
otherwise. Additionally, recall that p1 = p2 is the scenario in which we only have one cluster, for
which we have shown that we can achieve First Best.
Let FB(θ) = minσm00(σ(θ)).That is, FB(θ) is the minimum number of ‘0-0’ matches the prin-
cipal can achieve without any individual rationality or stability constraints.
Cases 1 and 2:
In these orthants, we have the following important fact.
Proposition 3. For all θ ∈ A
(n1,n2)
ǫ1,ǫ2 , and settings where p1 > p2 ≥ 1/2 or 1/2 ≤ p2 < p1,
FBC(θ) = FB(θ).
Proof. Since the Cluster First Best scheme matches as many type 1 agents to type 0 agents as
possible in each cluster, the number of ‘0-0’ matches in each cluster is simply half of the remaining
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(or excess) type 0 agents. Thus, we have:
FBC(θ) =
(
ℓ1(θ)− h1(θ)
2
)+
+
(
ℓ2(θ)− h2(θ)
2
)+
=
{
0 if p1 > p2 ≥ 1/2
ℓ1(θ)−h1(θ)
2 +
ℓ2(θ)−h2(θ)
2 if p2 < p1 < 1/2
=
(
(ℓ1(θ) + ℓ2(θ))− (h1(θ) + h2(θ))
2
)+
= FB(θ).
We can re-write the upper bound (UB) as follows:
OPT ≤
∑
θ∈A
(n1,n2)
ǫ1,ǫ2
λ(θ)FB(θ) + on1+n2(1). (UB1)
The proof of the lower bound for Cases 1 and 2 is straightforward. We use First Best as a crude
lower bound on OPT .
OPT ≥
∑
θ∈Θ
λ(θ)FB(θ)
≥
∑
θ∈A
(n1,n2)
ǫ1,ǫ2
λ(θ)FB(θ)
=
∑
θ∈A
(n1,n2)
ǫ1,ǫ2
λ(θ)FBC(θ). (LB1)
Putting the upper and lower bounds (UB1) and (LB1) together, we get that Cluster First Best
achieves on1+n2(1) regret for Cases 1 and 2.
Case 3: We consider the case where p1 > 1/2 > p2.
We obtain a lower bound on OPT via the dual, given by:
max
zθ free,yσi≥0
∑
θ
zθ
subject to zθ +
n−1∑
i=1
λ(θ)v¯(σi(θ))yσi ≤ λ(θ)m00(σ(θ)) ∀ θ ∈ Θ,σ ∈ Σ
(5)
Consider the restricted space of realizations A
(n1,n2)
ǫ1,ǫ2 . In this orthant, A
(n1,n2)
ǫ1,ǫ2 = {θ : h1(θ) >
n1/2, h2(θ) < n2/2}. This set is of interest because it corresponds exactly to the realizations for
which Cluster First Best fails, and some more sophisticated policies would succeed. Note that, for
θ ∈ A
(n1,n2)
ǫ1,ǫ2 , FBC(θ) =
ℓ2(θ)−h2(θ)
2 . If we modify the dual to be over this restricted space A
(n1,n2)
ǫ1,ǫ2 ,
we have the following result.
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Lemma 4. For all σ ∈ Σ, i ∈ [n − 1], there exists yσi such that zθ = λ(θ) ·
(
ℓ2(θ)−h2(θ)
2
)
=
λ(θ)FBC(θ), and (zθ, yσi) form a feasible set of solutions in the restricted space of realizations
A
(n1,n2)
ǫ1,ǫ2 .
To show this, we need to show that there exists yσi ≥ 0,∀ σ, i, such that:
n−1∑
i=1
λ(θ)v¯(σi(θ))yσi ≤ λ(θ)m00(σ(θ))− λ(θ) ·
ℓ2(θ)− h2(θ)
2
∀ θ ∈ A(n1,n2)ǫ1,ǫ2
⇐⇒
n−1∑
i=1
v¯(σi(θ))yσi ≤ m00(σ(θ))−
ℓ2(θ)− h2(θ)
2
∀ θ ∈ A(n1,n2)ǫ1,ǫ2 . (6)
We will actually prove something stronger – namely, we will find a set of binary yσi such that
Equation (6) holds. This problem, then, reduces to finding an index set Iσ for each permutation σ
such that
m00(σ(θ)) −
∑
i∈Iσ
v¯(σi(θ)) ≥
ℓ2(θ)− h2(θ)
2
∀ θ ∈ A(n1,n2)ǫ1,ǫ2 . (7)
We approach finding this set Iσ through the following key observation: any permutation σ can be
produced through a sequence of swaps of two agents. Let the ‘identity’ permutation be the ordering
σ0 = (1, 2, . . . , n1, n1+1, . . . , n1+n2). Without loss of generality, we can restrict to reasoning about
swaps of two agents with respect to the identity permutation, since agents within clusters can be
arbitrarily re-labeled.
At a high level, we seek to show that the principal does not benefit from swapping individual
across clusters. (We ignore the effect of swapping individuals within clusters, since we already know
that Cluster First Best does this in the optimal way, and again, agents within clusters can simply
be relabeled.) Thus, reasoning about the swaps that have created inter-cluster matches will be key.
Let N be the number of swaps that create inter-cluster matches, and σN be the permutation
which created the Nth inter-cluster match. We denote the identities of the swapped individuals
under σN to be σ
k
(1)
N
N , σ
k
(2)
N
N , respectively, where the superscript represents the cluster that each agent
finds herself in after the swap. Additionally, let σ
m(k
(1)
N
)
N , σ
m(k
(2)
N
)
N denote the respective identities of
the partners of the two swapped agents from the Nth swap. Finally, without loss of generality we
assume that k
(1)
1 < k
(1)
2 < . . . < k
(1)
N and k
(2)
1 > k
(2)
2 > . . . > k
(2)
N . This is simply done for ease of
notation, as the individuals are in each cluster are symmetric and can be relabeled. Let Nmax denote
the maximum number of swaps that can create inter-cluster matches with respect to the identity
permutation.
Example 3. Suppose n = 4 with agents A, B, C, and D. Additionally, suppose A and B are in
Cluster 1, and C and D are in Cluster 2, and we’ve performed N = 1 inter-cluster swaps, with
σ1 = (A < C < B < D) and θ = (1, 1, 0, 0). Then, σ1(θ) = (1, 0, 1, 0). Further, σ
k
(1)
1
1 = C σ
k
(2)
1
1 = B;
and σ
k
(1)
1
1 (θ) = 0 and σ
k
(2)
1
1 (θ) = 1; σ
m(k
(1)
1 )
1 = A, σ
m(k
(2)
1 )
1 = D; and σ
m(k
(1)
1 )
1 (θ) = 1, σ
m(k
(2)
1 )
1 (θ) = 0.
Recall that for fixed σ, θ, i ∈ [n − 1], we define v¯(σi(θ)) to be the difference between two con-
secutive agent types under ordering σ. That is, v¯(σi(θ)) = σi(θ) − σi+1(θ). Finally, we define IσN
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recursively, as follows. For all 1 ≤ N ≤ Nmax, N odd, IσN is such that:∑
i∈IσN
v¯(σiN (θ)) =
∑
i∈IσN−1
v¯(σiN−1(θ)) + σ
k
(1)
N
N (θ)− σ
k
(2)
N
N (θ).
For all 2 ≤ N ≤ Nmax, N even, IσN is such that:∑
i∈IσN
v¯(σiN (θ)) =
∑
i∈IσN−1
v¯(σiN−1(θ))− σ
m(k
(1)
N
)
N (θ) + σ
m(k
(2)
N
)
N (θ).
For N = 0, Iσ0 = ∅.
Lemma 5. For the above choice of IσN , and for all 1 ≤ N ≤ Nmax,
m00(σ(θ))−
∑
i∈IσN
v¯(σiN (θ)) ≥
ℓ2(θ)− h2(θ)
2
∀ θ ∈ A(n1,n2)ǫ1,ǫ2 .
Proof of Lemma 5: To show the claim, we will do an induction on N , the number of swaps that
have created inter-cluster matches.
For notational convenience we simply refer to ℓ2, h2 instead of ℓ2(θ), h2(θ). From context it
should be clear that we are referring to the number of type 0 and type 1 individuals for that specific
realization.
Base cases (even and odd):
1. N = 0:
N = 0 simply corresponds to the identity permutation, σ0. Consider θ
∗ ∈ argminθm00(σ(θ)).
This realization corresponds to the maximal pairing of 1s and 0s, in which we case we obtain
m00(σ0(θ
∗)) = ℓ2−h22 . Thus, when N = 0, for all θ:
m00(σ0(θ))−
∑
i∈Iσ0
v¯(σi0(θ)) = m00(σ0(θ))
≥
ℓ2 − h2
2
2. N = 1:
For N = 1, one individual from cluster 1 was placed in cluster 2, and one individual from cluster
2 was placed in cluster 1. Let Iσ1 be such that∑
i∈Iσ1
v¯(σi1(θ)) =
∑
i∈Iσ0
v¯(σi0(θ)) + σ
k(1)
1 (θ)− σ
k(2)
1 (θ)
= σk
(1)
1 (θ)− σ
k(2)
1 (θ)
Thus, for all θ, we have:
m00(σ1(θ))−
∑
i∈Iσ1
v¯(σi1(θ)) = m00(σ1(θ))− σ
k(1)
1 (θ) + σ
k(2)
1 (θ) ∀θ.
For θ such that σk
(1)
1 (θ) = σ
k(2)
1 (θ), m00(σ1(θ)) = m00(σ0(θ)) ≥
ℓ2−h2
2 , which we showed above.
We now consider θ such that σk
(1)
1 (θ) 6= σ
k(2)
1 (θ). There are two possibilities:
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(a) Post-swap σk
(1)
1 (θ) = 0, σ
k(2)
1 (θ) = 1 ⇐⇒ Pre-swap σ
k(1)
0 (θ) = 1, σ
k(2)
0 (θ) = 0:
In this case, we have:
m00(σ1(θ))− σ
k(1)
1 (θ) + σ
k(2)
1 (θ) = m00(σ1(θ)) + 1
We note that, in the worst case, m00(σ0(θ)) could only have decreased by 1 (i.e. there was
a ‘0-0’ match which became a ‘0-1’ or ‘1-0’ match, with no additional ‘0-0’ match created).
Thus, we have:
m00(σ1(θ)) ≥ m00(σ0(θ))− 1
=⇒ m00(σ1(θ)) + 1 ≥ m00(σ0(θ))
≥
ℓ2 − h2
2
where the last inequality follows from N = 0.
(b) Post-swap σk
(1)
1 (θ) = 1, σ
k(2)
1 (θ) = 0 ⇐⇒ Pre-swap σ
k(1)
0 (θ) = 0, σ
k(2)
0 (θ) = 1:
In this case, we have:
m00(σ1(θ))− σ
k(1)
1 (θ) + σ
k(2)
1 (θ) = m00(σ1(θ))− 1 (8)
We consider four cases, representing the possible types of the partners of the flipped agents.
Throughout these four cases, we will use the fact that σk
(1)
1 (θ) = 1, σ
k(2)
1 (θ) = 0 ⇐⇒
σk
(1)
0 (θ) = 0, σ
k(2)
0 (θ) = 1. Additionally, we use the important fact that, between two swaps,
the only change is the types of the swapped agents. The types of the partners of the swapped
agents remain the same.
i. σ
m(k(1))
1 (θ) = σ
m(k(2))
1 (θ) = 1:
Since the partners of both agents have the same type, flipping a 0 and 1 has no effect on
the number of ‘0-0’ matches. Thus, we have m00(σ1(θ)) = m00(σ0(θ)).
Additionally, since σk
(2)
0 (θ) = 1, we have two type 1 individuals paired together in the 2nd
cluster with respect to the identity permutation. Thus, in the worst case, m00(σ0(θ)) ≥
ℓ2−(h2−2)
2 =
ℓ2−h2
2 + 1, since the minimum number of ‘0-0’ matches is achieved by a
maximal pairing of 1s and 0s.
Thus, from Equation (8), we obtain:
m00(σ1(θ))− 1 = m00(σ0(θ))− 1
≥
(
ℓ2 − h2
2
+ 1
)
− 1
=
ℓ2 − h2
2
.
ii. σ
m(k(1))
1 (θ) = σ
m(k(2))
1 (θ) = 0:
For the same reason as the case above, we have m00(σ1(θ)) = m00(σ0(θ)).
Additionally, note that in this case we have σk
(1)
0 (θ) = 0, σ
m(k(1))
0 (θ) = 0. This implies
that, pre-swap (when agents were in the identity permutation), there was at least 1 ‘0-0’
match in the first cluster. Thus, we can conclude that m00(σ0(θ)) ≥
ℓ2−h2
2 +1, where the
first summand corresponds to the number of ‘0-0’ matches in the second cluster, and the
second summand corresponds to the ‘0-0’ match in the first cluster.
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From Equation (8):
m00(σ1(θ))− 1 = m00(σ0(θ))− 1
≥
(
ℓ2 − h2
2
+ 1
)
− 1
=
ℓ2 − h2
2
iii. σ
m(k(1))
1 (θ) = 1, σ
m(k(2))
1 (θ) = 0:
Since σ
m(k(2))
1 (θ) = 0 and σ
k(2)
1 (θ) = 0, flipping the two agents created a ‘0-0’ match.
Thus m00(σ1(θ)) = m00(σ0(θ)) + 1, and Equation (8) becomes:
m00(σ1(θ))− 1 = (m00(σ0(θ)) + 1)− 1
= m00(σ0(θ))
≥
ℓ2 − h2
2
.
iv. σ
m(k(1))
1 (θ) = 0, σ
m(k(2))
1 (θ) = 1:
We first note that, since σ
m(k(1))
1 (θ) = 0 and σ
k(1)
0 (θ) = 0, the swap destroyed one ‘0-0’
match in the first cluster. Additionally, since σ
m(k(2))
1 (θ) = 1, we know that no ‘0-0’ match
could have been created in the second cluster. Thus, m00(σ1(θ)) = m00(σ0(θ))− 1.
Since σk
(2)
0 (θ) = σ
m(k(2))
0 (θ) = 1, under σ0 there are two fewer type 1 agents available to
match with type 0 agents. Thus, the minimum number of ‘0-0’ matches in the second
cluster pre-swap (under σ0) is
ℓ2−(h2−2)
2 . Additionally, we just noted that there was one ‘0-
0’ match in the first cluster before the swap. Thusm00(σ0(θ)) ≥ 1+
ℓ2−(h2−2)
2 =
ℓ2−h2
2 +2.
Finally, Equation (8) becomes:
m00(σ1(θ))− 1 = (m00(σ0(θ))− 1)− 1
≥
(
ℓ2 − h2
2
+ 2
)
− 2
=
ℓ2 − h2
2
Inductive step (even): Let 1 ≤ N∗ ≤ Nmax be an arbitrary odd integer. Suppose that IσN∗ sat-
isfies the inequality of interest. We will show that the set IσN∗+1 satisfying
∑
i∈IσN∗+1
v¯(σiN∗+1(θ)) =∑
i∈IσN∗
v¯(σiN∗(θ))− σ
m(k
(1)
N∗+1
)
N∗+1 (θ) + σ
m(k
(2)
N∗+1
)
N∗+1 (θ) also satisfies the inequality of interest.
As before, we consider four scenarios:
1. σ
m(k
(1)
N∗+1
)
N∗+1 (θ) = 1, σ
m(k
(2)
N∗+1
)
N∗+1 (θ) = 1:
m00(σN∗+1(θ))−
∑
i∈IσN∗
v¯(σiN∗(θ)) + σ
m(k
(1)
N∗+1
)
N∗+1 (θ)− σ
m(k
(2)
N∗+1
)
N∗+1 (θ)
= m00(σN∗+1(θ))−
∑
i∈IσN∗
v¯(σiN∗(θ))
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Since σ
m(k
(1)
N∗+1
)
N∗+1 (θ) = σ
m(k
(2)
N∗+1
)
N∗+1 (θ) = 1, swapping two individuals will neither create not destroy
a ‘0-0’ pair. Thus, m00(σN∗+1(θ)) = m00(σN∗(θ)). So, we have:
m00(σN∗+1(θ))−
∑
i∈IσN∗
v¯(σiN∗(θ)) = m00(σN∗(θ))−
∑
i∈IσN∗
v¯(σiN∗(θ))
≥
ℓ2 − h2
2
by the inductive hypothesis.
2. σ
m(k
(1)
N∗+1
)
N∗+1 (θ) = 0, σ
m(k
(2)
N∗+1
)
N∗+1 (θ) = 0:
Since σ
m(k
(1)
N∗+1
)
N∗+1 (θ) = σ
m(k
(2)
N∗+1
)
N∗+1 (θ) = 0, swapping two individuals has no effect on the number
of ‘0-0’ matches – either the two swapped agents had the same type, in which case we have
established that m00(σN∗+1(θ)) = m00(σN∗(θ)), or one is a type 0 individual and one is a type
1 individual, in which case swapping them will simultaneously destroy and create a ‘0-0’ match.
Thus:
m00(σN∗+1(θ))−
∑
i∈IσN∗
v¯(σiN∗(θ)) + σ
m(k
(1)
N∗+1
)
N∗+1 (θ)− σ
m(k
(2)
N∗+1
)
N∗+1 (θ)
= m00(σN∗+1(θ))−
∑
i∈IσN∗
v¯(σiN∗(θ))
= m00(σN∗(θ))−
∑
i∈IσN∗
v¯(σiN∗(θ))
≥
ℓ2 − h2
2
,
where the inequality follows from the inductive hypothesis.
3. σ
m(k
(1)
N∗+1
)
N∗+1 (θ) = 1, σ
m(k
(2)
N∗+1
)
N∗+1 (θ) = 0:
m00(σN∗+1(θ))−
∑
i∈IσN∗
v¯(σiN∗(θ)) + σ
m(k
(1)
N∗+1
)
N∗+1 (θ)− σ
m(k
(2)
N∗+1
)
N∗+1 (θ)
= m00(σN∗+1(θ))−
∑
i∈IσN∗
v¯(σiN∗(θ)) + 1
In the worst case m00(σN∗(θ)) can only decrease by 1, since only one pair of individuals was
swapped. Thus:
m00(σN∗+1(θ))−
∑
i∈IσN∗
v¯(σiN∗(θ)) + 1 ≥ (m00(σN∗(θ))− 1)−
∑
i∈IσN∗
v¯(σiN∗(θ)) + 1
= m00(σN∗(θ))−
∑
i∈IσN∗
v¯(σiN∗(θ))
≥
ℓ2 − h2
2
by the inductive hypothesis.
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4. σ
m(k
(1)
N∗+1
)
N∗+1 (θ) = 0, σ
m(k
(2)
N∗+1
)
N∗+1 (θ) = 1:
m00(σN∗+1(θ))−
∑
i∈IσN∗
v¯(σiN∗(θ)) + σ
m(k
(1)
N∗+1
)
N∗+1 (θ)− σ
m(k
(2)
N∗+1
)
N∗+1 (θ)
= m00(σN∗+1(θ))−
∑
i∈IσN∗
v¯(σiN∗(θ))− 1
Within this case, we consider four cases, based on the types of the swapped individuals for the
second swap:
i. Post-swap σ
k
(1)
N∗+1
N∗+1 (θ) = 1, σ
k
(2)
N∗+1
N∗+1 (θ) = 1 ⇐⇒ Pre-swap σ
k
(1)
N∗+1
N∗ (θ) = 1, σ
k
(2)
N∗+1
N∗ (θ) = 1:
Recall that swapping two individuals with the same type has no effect on the number of ‘0-0’
matches. Thus, m00(σN∗+1(θ)) = m00(σN∗(θ)).
Additionally, since σ
k
(2)
N∗+1
N∗ (θ) = σ
m(k
(2)
N∗+1
)
N∗ (θ) = 1, we can view the permutation σN∗ as one
on n1 individuals in cluster 1, n2 − 2 individuals in cluster 2, and h2 − 2 type 1 individuals
in the second cluster. Thus, by the inductive hypothesis, we have:
m00(σN∗+1(θ))−
∑
i∈IσN∗
v¯(σiN∗(θ))− 1 = m00(σN∗(θ))−
∑
i∈IσN∗
v¯(σiN∗(θ))− 1
≥
ℓ2 − (h2 − 2)
2
− 1
=
ℓ2 − h2
2
ii. Post-swap σ
k
(1)
N∗+1
N∗+1 (θ) = 0, σ
k
(2)
N∗+1
N∗+1 (θ) = 0 ⇐⇒ Pre-swap σ
k
(1)
N∗+1
N∗ (θ) = 0, σ
k
(2)
N∗+1
N∗ (θ) = 0:
As above, we havem00(σN∗+1(θ)) = m00(σN∗(θ)). Additionally, since σ
k
(1)
N∗+1
N∗ (θ) = σ
m(k
(1)
N∗+1
)
N∗ (θ) =
0, we know that there is a ‘0-0’ match in the first cluster. Thus, we can view the permutation
σN∗ as one on n1−2 individuals in cluster 1 with ℓ1−2 type 0 individuals, and n2 individuals
in cluster 2, plus an extra ‘0-0’ match. By the inductive hypothesis:
m00(σN∗+1(θ))−
∑
i∈IσN∗
v¯(σiN∗(θ))− 1 = m00(σN∗(θ))−
∑
i∈IσN∗
v¯(σiN∗(θ))− 1
≥
(
ℓ2 − h2
2
+ 1
)
− 1
=
ℓ2 − h2
2
iii. Post-swap σ
k
(1)
N∗+1
N∗+1 (θ) = 0, σ
k
(2)
N∗+1
N∗+1 (θ) = 1 ⇐⇒ Pre-swap σ
k
(1)
N∗+1
N∗ (θ) = 1, σ
k
(2)
N∗+1
N∗ (θ) = 0:
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Since σ
k
(1)
N∗+1
N∗+1 (θ) = σ
m(k
(1)
N∗+1
)
N∗ (θ) = 0, the swap created an additional ‘0-0’ match. Thus,
m00(σN∗+1(θ)) = m00(σN∗(θ)) + 1. We have:
m00(σN∗+1(θ))−
∑
i∈IσN∗
v¯(σiN∗(θ))− 1 = (m00(σN∗(θ)) + 1)−
∑
i∈IσN∗
v¯(σiN∗(θ))− 1
= m00(σN∗(θ))−
∑
i∈IσN∗
v¯(σiN∗(θ))
≥
ℓ2 − h2
2
by the inductive hypothesis.
iv. Post-swap σ
k
(1)
N∗+1
N∗+1 (θ) = 1, σ
k
(2)
N∗+1
N∗+1 (θ) = 0 ⇐⇒ Pre-swap σ
k
(1)
N∗+1
N∗ (θ) = 0, σ
k
(2)
N∗+1
N∗ (θ) = 1:
Note that, in this case, a ‘0-0’ match in the first cluster was destroyed, and none was created.
Thus, m00(σN∗+1(θ)) = m00(σN∗(θ))− 1.
Additionally, since σ
k
(2)
N∗+1
N∗ (θ) = σ
m(k
(2)
N∗+1
)
N∗ (θ) = 1 and σ
k
(1)
N∗+1
N∗ (θ) = σ
m(k
(1)
N∗+1
)
N∗ (θ) = 0, we can
view the permutation σN∗ as one on n1 − 2 individuals in cluster 1, plus a ‘0-0’ match in
cluster 1, and n2 − 2 individuals in cluster 2, with h2 − 2 type 1 individuals in the second
cluster. Thus, by the inductive hypothesis:
m00(σN∗+1(θ))−
∑
i∈IσN∗
v¯(σiN∗(θ))− 1 = (m00(σN∗(θ))− 1)−
∑
i∈IσN∗
v¯(σiN∗(θ))− 1
= m00(σN∗+1(θ))−
∑
i∈IσN∗
v¯(σiN∗(θ))− 2
≥
(
ℓ2 − (h2 − 2)
2
+ 1
)
− 2
=
ℓ2 − h2
2
.
Inductive step (odd): Let 2 ≤ N∗ ≤ Nmax be an arbitrary even integer. Suppose that IσN∗ sat-
isfies the inequality of interest. We will show that the set IσN∗+1 satisfying
∑
i∈IσN∗+1
v¯(σiN∗+1(θ)) =∑
i∈IσN∗
v¯(σiN∗(θ))− σ
k
(1)
N∗+1
N∗+1 (θ) + σ
k
(2)
N∗+1
N∗+1 (θ) also satisfies the inequality of interest.
We omit this proof, since it is entirely analogous to the case where N = 1, and the case-by-case
work is identical to what was done for the even inductive step.
Thus, we have shown that this choice of IσN satisfies Equation (7), and Lemma 4 immediately
follows.
Using Lemma 4, we now have the lower bound for the case where p1 > 1/2 > p2, in our restricted
space of realizations.
We construct a feasible solution to the dual using our {yσi} construction. We already showed
that, for all θ ∈ A
(n1,n2)
ǫ1,ǫ2 (i.e. such that h1(θ) > n1/2, h2(θ) < n2/2), zθ = λ(θ) ·
ℓ2−h2
2 is feasible.
Thus, it remains to consider θ ∈ A¯
(n1,n2)
ǫ1,ǫ2 . For such θ, and the set of yσi that we constructed, we
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have:
zθ = min
σ
λ(θ)
(
m00(σ(θ))−
n−1∑
i=1
v¯(σi(θ))yσi
)
= min
σ
λ(θ)
(
m00(σ(θ)))−
∑
i∈Iσ
v¯(σi(θ))
)
≥ −nλ(θ),
where we used the crude bounds m00(σ(θ)) ≥ 0, and
∑
i∈Iσ
v¯(σi(θ)) ≤ n.
By weak duality:
OPT ≥
∑
θ∈A
(n1,n2)
ǫ1,ǫ2
zθ − n
∑
θ∈A
(n1,n2)
ǫ1,ǫ2
c
λ(θ)
≥
∑
θ∈A
(n1,n2)
ǫ1,ǫ2
zθ −
2(n1 + n2)
n21 + n
2
2
=
∑
θ∈A
(n1,n2)
ǫ1,ǫ2
λ(θ) ·
ℓ2(θ)− h2(θ)
2
− on1+n2(1)
=
∑
θ∈A
(n1,n2)
ǫ1,ǫ2
λ(θ)FBC(θ)− on1+n2(1). (LB2)
where the second inequality follows from Hoeffding’s inequality, as was done to derive the upper
bound.
Putting the upper and lower bounds (UB) and (LB2) together, we obtain our final result.
Proof of Corollary 1: Given p1, p2, . . . , pK , we define A
(n1,n2,...,nK)
ǫ1,ǫ2,...,ǫK analogously to the K = 2
cluster case. That is:
A(n1,n2,...,nK)ǫ1,ǫ2,...,ǫK = {θ : |h1(θ)− n1p1| ≤ ǫ1n1, |h2(θ)− n2p2| ≤ ǫ2n2, . . . , |hk(θ)− nKpK | ≤ ǫKnK} .
(9)
As before, we will require that A
(n1,n2,...,nK)
ǫ1,ǫ2,...,ǫK be contained in the same orthant as (n1p1, . . . , nKpK),
i.e. ǫi ≤ |pi − 1/2| ∀ i ∈ [K].
We will focus only on the interesting cases, in which there exists at least one cluster i such
that pi < 1/2, and one cluster j such that pj > 1/2. Otherwise, the proof is identical to that of
Proposition 3.
Lemma 6. For all θ ∈ A
(n1,n2)
ǫ1,ǫ2 , there exists yσi such that zθ = λ(θ)
[(
ℓ1(θ)−h1(θ)
2
)+
+ . . .+
(
ℓK(θ)−hK(θ)
2
)+]
=
λ(θ)FBC(θ) is a feasible dual solution.
Proof. We prove this by induction.
Base case: We already showed this for K = 2.
Inductive step: Let K∗ > 2 be an arbitrary integer. Suppose the statement is true for K∗.
The goal is to show that it must be true for K∗ + 1. We prove this by contrapositive.
28
Suppose the statement is false for K∗ + 1 clusters. This means that, for all yσi ≥ 0, there exists
a pair (θ, σ) such that
m00(σ(θ))−
∑
i
v¯(σi(θ))yσi <
(
ℓ1 − h1
2
)+
+ . . .+
(
ℓK∗ − hK∗
2
)+
+
(
ℓK∗+1 − hK∗+1
2
)+
(10)
We consider two cases:
1. pK∗ < 1/2, pK∗+1 < 1/2:
In this case, from inequality (10) we obtain:
m00(σ(θ))−
∑
i
v¯(σi(θ))yσi <
(
ℓ1 − h1
2
)+
+ . . . +
ℓK∗ − hK∗
2
+
ℓK∗+1 − hK∗+1
2
=
(
ℓ1 − h1
2
)+
+ . . . +
(ℓK∗ + ℓK∗+1)− (hK∗ + hK∗+1)
2
(11)
Consider the right-hand side of inequality (11). Note that this corresponds exactly to the scenario
with K∗ clusters with n˜K∗ agents, where n˜K∗ = nK∗ + nK∗+1. Let ℓ˜K∗, h˜K∗ be the number of
type 0 and type 1 agents, respectively, in the K∗th cluster. Let θ˜ be such that ℓ˜K∗ = ℓK∗ +
ℓK∗+1, h˜K∗ = hK∗ + hK∗+1. Additionally, since θ ∈ A
(n1,n2,...,nK∗+1)
ǫ1,ǫ2,...,ǫK∗+1 , we have:
ℓK∗ > nK∗/2, ℓK∗+1 > nK∗+1/2 =⇒ ℓ˜K∗ >
nK∗ + nK∗+1
2
=⇒ θ˜ ∈ A
(n1,n2,...,(nK∗+nK∗+1))
ǫ1,ǫ2,...,ǫK∗ .
Thus, by inequality (11), there exists σ ∈ Σ such that, for any yσi ≥ 0, for this specific realization
θ˜:
m00(σ(θ))−
∑
i
v¯(σi(θ))yσi <
(
ℓ1 − h1
2
)+
+ . . . +
(
ℓ˜K∗ − h˜K∗
2
)+
,
which implies that zθ = λ(θ)
[∑K∗
k=1
(
ℓk(θ)−hk(θ)
2
)+]
is not feasible in the K∗-cluster case.
2. pK∗ > 1/2, pK∗+1 < 1/2:
In this case, by inequality (10):
m00(σ(θ))−
∑
i
v¯(σi(θ))yσi <
ℓK∗+1 − hK∗+1
2
=
(
ℓ1 − h1
2
)+
+
(
ℓK∗ − hK∗
2
)+
+
ℓK∗+1 − hK∗+1
2
=
(
(ℓ1 + ℓK∗)− (h1 + hK∗)
2
)+
+
ℓK∗+1 − hK∗+1
2
where the last equality follows from the fact that ℓ1 < n1/2, ℓK∗ < nK∗/2 =⇒ ℓ1 + ℓK∗ <
h1 + hK∗
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Applying a similar argument as the one in Case 1, we find that, if we are in the K∗-cluster case
and fix yσi ≥ 0, for θ such that ℓ˜K∗ = ℓ1 + ℓK∗, h˜K∗ = h1 + h
∗
K , zθ = λ(θ)
[∑K∗
k=1
(
ℓk−hk
2
)+]
is not
feasible.
This inductive argument gives us many properties about the K > 2 setting for free, namely
that, for this set of zθ, θ ∈ A
(n1,n2)
ǫ1,ǫ2 , one can construct a yσi ∈ {0, 1},∀ σ ∈ Σ, i ∈ [n − 1], such
that (zθ, yσi) is dual feasible. The argument for this is immediate, once one realizes that the K > 2
case can be reduced to the K = 2 case, by grouping all clusters such that pk > 1/2, and pk < 1/2,
respectively.
We derive the upper and lower bounds in an identical fashion to the K = 2 case, and obtain our
main result:∑
θ∈A
(n1,n2,...,nK )
ǫ1,ǫ2,...,ǫK
λ(θ)FBC(θ)− on1+...+nK (1) ≤ OPT ≤
∑
θ∈A
(n1,n2,...,nK )
ǫ1,ǫ2,...,ǫK
λ(θ)FBC(θ) + on1+...+nK (1)
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